The Horn of Africa has entered a geopolitical moment unlike anything it has experienced in recent decades. Global supply chains are shifting, insecurity in the Red Sea is disrupting trade, and climate shocks are intensifying. The world has transitioned beyond the unipolar era into a complex multipolar landscape characterized by competing foreign policies, fragmented regional strategies, and weak institutions. For the Horn, this shift brings new partners and sources of investment, but also sharper competition, greater external pressure, and a more complicated political environment. Understanding how the region reached this point is essential for navigating what comes next.
A REGION LONG SHAPED BY GREAT-POWER RIVALRY
The Horn’s political structures were forged during the Cold War, when the region became one of Africa’s major battlegrounds for proxy conflicts. Ethiopia aligned closely with the United States and its Western partners. Somalia shifted into the Soviet sphere before later switching sides. Sudan oscillated between ideological poles. Eritrea’s independence struggle unfolded amid steady flows of external support. These dynamics entrenched security sectors geared toward regime survival rather than citizen protection, and borders that rarely reflected social or historical realities.
The post-1991 era did little to resolve these patterns. Somalia collapsed into a prolonged state of failure. Somaliland developed a hybrid political order but remained unrecognized. Sudan and South Sudan separated, but conflict persisted on both sides of the new border and civil wars. Eritrea remained isolated. Ethiopia’s ethnic federal experiment initially expanded political inclusion but also generated recurrent tensions and, ultimately, civil war. IGAD, revitalized in 1996 and again in 2023, played a key role in mediating the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan and supported Somalia’s political transition. Yet donor dependence and divergent member-state agendas prevented IGAD from evolving into a strong regional anchor.
This legacy significantly influences how the Horn experiences today’s multipolar moment, with institutions that are too weak to negotiate effectively and regional coordination that is too shallow to act collectively.
GEOGRAPHY: A STRATEGIC ASSET THAT TOO EASILY BECOMES A LIABILITY
Few regions sit at a more strategic crossroads than the Horn of Africa. The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait remain vital arteries of global commerce. In 2024, attacks on commercial vessels by Yemen’s Houthi movement diverted shipping routes and drove maritime costs sharply upward, highlighting the region’s global significance.
Djibouti capitalized on its location by attracting foreign military bases and expanding port infrastructure. Ethiopia’s landlocked status has made sea access a central political issue, as evident in its reliance on Djibouti, its engagement with Kenya’s LAPSSET corridor, and the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland. Somalia and Somaliland hold long coastlines with major commercial potential. Eritrea’s Massawa and Assab ports remain strategically positioned but politically constrained.
Yet strategic geography has not translated into regional leverage. The Horn lacks a regional agenda that facilitates a shared maritime strategy. Corridors are not harmonized. Infrastructure connects states to external markets far more than it connects them to one another. Geography can be an asset, but without political coordination, it becomes a vulnerability exposed to global shocks.
MULTIPOLAR COMPETITION: MORE ACTORS, NOT BETTER GOVERNANCE
The Horn of Africa today sits at the intersection of an unusually dense constellation of foreign powers, each advancing its own priorities across the region’s corridors, ports, and political arenas. China’s presence remains the most visible, with its Belt and Road Initiative underpinning flagship projects such as the Ethiopia–Djibouti railway, industrial zones around Addis Ababa, and the expansion of power networks. Alongside China, the Gulf states, particularly the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have become decisive actors. Their fingerprints are visible in the transformation of Berbera, the commercial ambitions around Djibouti, the contested potential of Assab, and the growing use of financial and political mediation as tools of influence. Türkiye has carved out its own role, most prominently through its military and training base in Mogadishu, while its companies have become major players in Ethiopia’s construction and manufacturing sectors. India, meanwhile, is steadily expanding its naval presence in the western Indian Ocean as part of its broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Western actors have not disappeared; the United States and the European Union remain central to counterterrorism, governance, and humanitarian programming. Russia and the expanded BRICS+ bloc now offer alternative diplomatic and financial channels, adding yet another layer to an already crowded landscape.
What this proliferation of actors has not produced, however, is better governance. Many deals remain opaque, negotiated behind closed doors with limited parliamentary scrutiny or public disclosure. Port concessions, basing agreements, and digital infrastructure partnerships often deepen elite power rather than strengthen state institutions. External rivalries between Gulf capitals, as well as between China and Western actors, and now increasingly within BRICS+, reinforce political fragmentation rather than regional coordination. Multipolarity, in practice, has multiplied the number of suitors without improving the rules of engagement. Instead, it has exposed how weak those rules have always been, and how vulnerable the region remains to being shaped from outside rather than by its own collective agency.
AFRICA DEBATES A CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER — BUT THE HORN ARRIVES WITH A FRAGILE HAND
Across the continent, the African Union’s G20 membership, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and Agenda 2063 provide opportunities to shape global rules. But the Horn enters this moment from a weak baseline. Ethiopia is navigating post-war fragility. Sudan is engulfed in a devastating civil conflict. Somalia’s insurgency persists. Eritrea remains isolated. Djibouti’s economic model relies heavily on foreign base rents. Somaliland maintains stability but lacks recognition. IGAD remains divided and struggles to provide strategic direction.
The region is strategically central yet politically fragmented; a dangerous combination in an era of geopolitical competition.
WHAT WILL DETERMINE THE REGION’S TRAJECTORY? THREE STRUCTURAL GAPS
1. Coordination Gap — No Shared Regional Positions
Horn states rarely develop joint positions on ports, debt, climate, security, or Red Sea governance. Ethiopia’s multi-track search for sea access, involving Djibouti, Berbera, LAPSSET, and revived discussion of Assab, illustrates how major decisions unfold without IGAD consultation. External actors easily exploit this fragmentation, negotiating separately with each government.
2. Credibility Gap — Opaque Deals Undermine Bargaining Power
Major agreements, such as port concessions, basing rights, mining deals, and digital infrastructure partnerships, are often negotiated in secrecy. This undermines parliamentary oversight, weakens public trust, and prevents coordination among neighboring states. Secrecy also strengthens external partners, who can strike bilateral deals that lock states into unfavorable terms.
3. Connectivity Gap — Corridors Serve Global Markets More Than the Region
Infrastructure development is increasingly linking the Horn to global markets, rather than uniting the region. The Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway efficiently moves goods, but it does little to promote intra-regional trade. Berbera Port’s expansion increases external connectivity; however, without harmonized customs procedures or integrated transport networks, its benefits remain limited to bilateral use. These three gaps explain why the region remains strategically important yet politically weak, and why multipolarity often reinforces fragmentation rather than regional agency.
THREE FUTURES FOR THE HORN BY 2035
1. Fragmented Periphery
In this future, the Horn of Africa remains fractured along political, economic, and security lines. Conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia persist or re-emerge, making long-term stability elusive. Ports such as Djibouti, Berbera, and Port Sudan function as isolated rent hubs serving the interests of ruling elites rather than regional development. Bilateral deals often dominate, frequently negotiated in secrecy and heavily influenced by the interests of Gulf states, China, or Western powers. IGAD becomes largely symbolic, unable to convene or coordinate meaningful regional responses. External powers shape outcomes more decisively than governments in the region, leaving the Horn reactive and vulnerable.
2. Managed Co-existence
This scenario reflects a region that avoids collapse but remains trapped in shallow stability. Conflicts persist without resolving their underlying political roots, allowing governments to regain partial control while fragility remains underneath. Trade improves modestly as key corridors expand, yet integration stalls due to uneven customs regimes, regulations, and security conditions. Multipolar competition persists, but states are learning to navigate it pragmatically, striking a balance between Gulf investments, Chinese infrastructure, Western security partnerships, and new BRICS+ channels. The result is a Horn that functions better than before, but without the institutional depth or collective strategy required for long-term transformation.
3. Connected, Assertive Horn
In the most ambitious future, Horn states establish shared rules for port governance, maritime security, investment flows, and shipping standards. Corridor development becomes harmonised, reducing transport costs and creating regional value chains. Transparent agreements replace opaque bargains, strengthening institutions and public oversight. Diplomacy becomes non-binary: states cooperate with China, Gulf actors, the EU, the U.S., and India based on clearly defined regional priorities rather than geopolitical alignment. Anchored in AfCFTA and Agenda 2063, the Horn begins to negotiate collectively on Red Sea issues and global economic platforms. It becomes a rule-maker, not merely a rule-taker, for the first time.